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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Wilbur J. Stites, 
from a verdict and judgment entered in the District Court 
for Cache County, State of Utah, finding and adjudging the 
defendant guilty of misapplying money of a corporation and 
sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one nor more than ten years in the State Prison. The 
defendant will be hereinafter referred to as the appellant, 
and the plaintiff will be hereinafter referred to as the re-
spondent. 
The appellant was charged by information as follows: 
"WILBUR J. STITES, alias Webb Stites and alias W. 
J. Stites, having heretofore been duly committed to 
this court by Jesse P. Rich, a Committing Magistrate 
within and for the County of Cache, State of Utah 
to answer to this charge, is accused by Curtis E. 
Calderwood, District Attorney of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah by this Information of 
the crime of misapplying money of a corporation, a 
felony as follows: 
"That on or about the 3rd day of December, 
1954 at the County of Cache, State of Utah, the said 
defendant did then and there as a director and an 
officer of a corporation of Valley Motor Company, 
a Utah Corporation wilfully, unlawfully and felon-
iously misapply money of the said corporation in the 
amount of $2,000.00 which he had received from 
Robert S. Budge which was the property of the said 
corporation, contrary to the provisions of the statute 
of the State aforesaid in such cases made and pro-
vided, and against the peace and dignity of the State 
of Utah. Dated this 14th day of June, 1955." 
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The appellant filed a motion to quash for the reason 
alleged that the information did not charge the defendant 
with the commission of an offense (R. 2), which motion was 
denied by the court. Thereupon the appellant entered a plea 
of "not guilty" And the cause was set for jury trial July 20, 
1955. 
The jury was duly selected and the trial began on July 
20,1955. 
All of the evidence presented at the trial was offered 
by witnesses called by the respondent, excepting the testi-
mony of Attorney George Preston, called by the appellant. 
BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE ORGANIZATION 
AND CONTROL 
The Valley Motor Company was issued a certificate of 
incorporation by the State of Utah, January 8, 1954 (PI Ex-
hibit No. 2). The total authorized capital stock of the cor-
poration was 1000 shares at a par value of $100.00 each of 
which the incorporators subscribed as follows (PI Exhibit 
No.3): 
Wilbur J. Stites 
Gene Smart 
Dean J. Rogers 
Seth S. Allen 
Zachary T. Champlin 
596 shares 
1 share 
1 share 
1 share 
1 share 
All of the aforesaid incorporators except, Zachary T. 
Champlin, were named in the Articles of Incorporation as 
the first board of directors, with the appellant, Wilbur J. 
Stites named as president, Dean Rogers as Vice President 
and Gene Smart as Secretary-Treasurer (PI Exhibit No. 3). 
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The incorporators and Board of Directors each held 
one meeting, both held on January 18, 1954, at the office of 
Valley Motor Company, Logan, Utah, the incorporator's 
meeting being at 8:00 o'clock p.m. and the board meeting 
at 9:00 o'clock p.m. (R. 49). No other meetings were held 
during the year 1954 (R. 38 and 39). 
At these meetings, Mr. Champlin, the attorney who 
drafted the articles of incorporation, presented certain mat-
ters to the incorporators and directors in the form of recom-
mended by-laws (R. 42 and 43) but the minutes as sub-
sequently typed were never approved by the Board nor were 
they ever signed (R. 43) and the original notes taken at the 
meeting could not be found (R. 50). The purported minutes 
were offered by the respondent to show that the First 
National Bank of Logan was the bank at which company 
funds were to be deposited, but Mr. Champlin admitted this 
was done because the bank required a resolution authorizing 
the depository (R. 42). Upon objection of appellant to intro-
duction of the purported minutes, a discussion before the 
jury transpired between the trial judge and counsel for the 
parties (R. 56 and 57) and the judge sustained the objection 
upon admission of the appellant that the First National 
Bank was desigated as a depository, though not a manda-
torily exclusive depository. However, subsequently (R. 120) 
the respondent again offered the minutes in evidence and the 
court admitted the same over objection of appellant with the 
following comment: (R. 120) 
"Under the circumstances the book is received, but, 
gentlemen, the court is not characterizing the book 
as a stockholders' book or minute book. It's some 
papers with writing on them, unsigned. So for what 
it's worth, it's received." 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Champlin, one of the incorporators, testified that 
he paid $10.00 on the one share to which he had subscribed 
(R. 43) and added that he paid the remainder in services, 
although he never did bill the company for such services and 
had been paid $390.00 cash (R. 29) and had never filed any 
claim for more; that he signed as an incorporator because the 
law requires five incorporators; that the incorporators other 
than Stites subscribed to one share each (R. 44 and 45). 
The corporation was organized to be run by appellant 
(R. 133). Appellant and Wayne Craw, Jay Howell and Clair 
Lundberg each advanced $6,000.00 to the corporation to 
commence business and no other cash was advanced by 
any other parties (R. 135). Howell (R. 133), Craw (R. 114) 
and Lundberg (R. 106) advanced said $6,000.00 each as a 
loan and were creditors of the corporation; however, they 
had a side agreement with appellant that Craw, Howell and 
Lundberg would be employed by the company at a fixed sal-
ary of $500.00 per month, each, and that Stites would 
draw a higher salary and make equalization payments 
on the side to the other three from Stites own salary 
(Howell R. 104) (Craw R. 113 and 114). The board of 
Directors named in the articles, as such, did not under-
take to direct the affairs of the company, and in fact Rogers 
and Allen knew very little, if anything about the automobile 
business, and the management and direction of the company 
was left solely to appellant (Lundberg R. 137 line 13; Brit-
zell R. 87). 
In addition to the side payments to Lundberg, Craw and 
Howell, the appellant was to make payments from his per-
sonal account after drawings from the corporation, upon a 
$6,000.00 note to Gene Smart (R. 87 -88) and upon a $25,000 
note to W. W. Lundberg for auto parts (R. 135 and 136). 
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TRANSACTION WHICH WAS SUBJECT OF CHARGE 
Dr. RobertS. Budge testified that on December 3, 1954 
he purchased a Buick Riviera, 1955, from Valley Motor Com-
pany (R. 62). Dr. Budge traded a 1951 Studebaker for the 
Buick and agreed to pay $2000.00 in cash additional. This 
$2000.00 additional cash was paid by check as appears from 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #4, substantially, as follows: 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH 
Smithfield, Utah, 2 Dec - 1954 
Pay to the order of WEBB STITES ____________ $2,000.00 
Two Thousand and No/100 ------------------------------------Dollars 
s/ Robert S. Budge 
This check was given by Dr. Budge to appellant (R. 63). 
The indorsement on the back of the check was: "Webb Stites 
for deposit only" (PI Exhibit 4), and was deposited to the 
personal account of appellant in the Logan Branch of First 
Security Bank. (R. 67 -68) . 
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE OF PURPORTED 
MISAPPLICATION 
Don Britzell, bookkeeper and office manager of Valley 
Motor Co. testified that he was employed by "Webb Stites 
and Valley Motor Company" (R. 69); that the Buick auto-
mobile purchased by Budge was the property of Valley 
Motor Co., and that the records and books which Britzell 
kept showed a balance due and owing to Valley Motor Co. 
of $2000.00 by Dr. Budge (R. 73-76); that there is no 
record of the receipt of $2000.00 by Valley Motor Co. from 
Dr. Budge (R. 77). Under cross examination (R. 79) Britzell 
admitted that the records would show nothing other than 
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what was placed in the records by Britzell or the office girl 
under Britzell's direction. Britzell, when first confronted 
with the matter as to whether Britzell had been directed 
by appellant to charge the $2000.00 against appellant's ac-
count, hedged as follows (R. 79-81): 
Q Now, Mr. Britzell, don't you recall that Mr. Stites 
told you to charge that $2,000 to his account? 
A Not directly. 
Q But you remember a discussion of that, don't 
you? 
A I do. He might have been-
Q But you didn't charge it to his account, did you? 
A No. 
Q And you still haven't done so? 
A I couldn't charge it to his account as long as 
there was an outstanding contract to Robert Budge. 
Q Didn't he tell you to charge it to his account? 
A Not that I remember of directly, no. 
Q Haven't you told some other persons that's what 
he told you to do? 
A I have not. 
Q You haven't told anybody? 
A Not that he told me to charge it directly to him. 
Q Have you discussed this matter with the receiver. 
A With the receiver? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Well, what do you recall he told you? 
A He just said, "Charge it." That's all he said, as 
I remember. Of course, we were doing a lot of other 
things that same evening, and he might have meant 
charge it to him. 
Q You don't know what he meant? 
A I don't really, no. 
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Q But you do remember his saying to charge it? 
A That's right. 
Q And you don't remember telling some other 
people that he had told you to charge it to his ac-
count? 
A No. 
Q But you know it's likely that that's what he in-
tended to do, don't you? 
A He may have done. 
MR. CALDERWOOD: I object to that as a 
conclusion of the witness, and I object to the forrh of 
the question. 
THE COURT: On cross examination it's all 
right. I'll take the answer. 
Q Is that right? 
A It could be, yes. 
Q Now there had been a number of charges made to 
the account of Webb Stites on his personal account. 
He had an account in the files just like this didn't he? 
A At times. 
Q And you made various charges to his account 
there, didn't you? 
A I did. 
Q And some of them were in connection with auto-
mobiles, weren't they? 
A They were. 
Q So that there were other transactions that were 
charged to his account that was coming to the busi-
ness; is that right? 
A That's right. 
Q And there were some checks that were made to 
his account deposited to his account; he paid some 
company business by his own checks; isn't that 
right? 
A Indirectly, yes. 
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Q But he did pay them? 
A Yes. 
Q And there were some payments being made to 
persons for parts and so forth for the benefit of the 
company that were paid out of his personal account; 
isn't that right? 
A Directly I would say yes. 
Q And they remained as charges against his ac-
count, didn't they? 
A That's right. 
Q And at the end of the year or sometime, it was 
supposed to be reconciled; isn't that right? 
A That's right. 
Nevertheless, Britzell said he made the charge against 
Budge instead of Stites (R. 82 lines 14-19). Britzell was re-
called (R. 153) and when asked when he was first informed 
to charge the $2,000.00 to Stites account, said he never knew 
it was to be charged to Stites account (R. 154 line 4); how-
ever} when confronted with a memorandum in Britzelfs own 
handwriting which showed the names on a number of con-
tracts} Britzell admitted that he made a notation opposite 
the name of Robert Budge} ((Charge Webb}} (R. 154). On 
further redirect examination (R. 154-155) Britzell said he 
made the notation sometime in January} 1955J possibly on 
January 10, 1955. 
John Clay, a certified public accountant who was em-
ployed by respondent to examine the books of Valley Motor 
Company (R. 89) testified that the books showed the pur-
chase of the car by Valley Motor Company and its sub-
sequent sale to Robert Budge but the books did not show 
any credit of $2,000.00 to the Budge contract. Clay testified 
that from examination of the books it would apear that 
Stites owed the company by January 1955 the sum of 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
$70,017.15 (R. 92) and that as of October 1, 1955, it ap-
peared from the books that Stites owed the company 
$45,849.76 (R. 95); however he admitted that he would not 
have credited Stites except for what the books showed. The 
cash receipts journal and many of the side payments from 
Stites account on company obligations would not be credited 
in the books (R. 96). Britzell, the bookkeeper, when shown 
the ledger sheet prepared by him showing the account of 
Stites up to October 16, admitted that the ledger sheet 
showed Stites owing only $17,000.00 as of October 16, 1954 
(R. 118), as compared with the $45,849.76 figure which Clay 
found from examining the same books. 
Over objection of appellant the court permitted Clair 
Lundberg (R. 99-104) and Wayne Craw (R. 109-111), em-
ployees of Valley Motor Company and persons with whom 
appellant was by agreement to divide his increased salary 
and allowances, to testify concerning a purported conver-
sation which was said to have transpired in January 1955, in 
the upper room of Valley Motor Company between Clair 
Lundberg, Jay Howell, Wayne Craw and the appellant 
Lundberg testified that he asked appellant "What did you do 
with the $2,000.00 from Bob Budge?" to which the appellant 
replied "I took that to cover another fictitious deal" (R. 104) 
and didn't know whether it was a fictitious deal being cov-
ered for the corporation or other persons (R. 107). 
At the conclusion of the testimony of Wayne Craw (R. 
120), the respondent rested and the appellant moved to dis-
miss the information for the reason that there had not been 
presented sufficient facts to prove the commission of the 
offense charged, which motion was argued at length by ap-
pellant and denied by the court. 
10 
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Over objection of appellant the respondent was permit-
ted to reopen its case (R. 122), and presented Jay Howell as 
a witness to testify, over objection of appellant, further con-
cerning the conversation relative to the "fictitious deal" 
which was previously testified to by Clair Lundberg and 
Wayne Craw. The following transpired beginning at (R. 
123 Line 30) : 
Q Was this conversation with Mr. Stites- where 
did it take place? 
A In the upper room previously mentioned by Clair 
Lundberg and Wayne Craw. 
Q And that's in the office of the Valley Motor Com-
pany? 
A It's the upstairs of the Valley Motor Company. 
Q And could you fix the date of that conversation? 
A That would have been approximately four o'clock 
in the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1954. 
Q Nineteen fifty-four? 
A Yes. Or 1955, I beg your pardon. 
Q Now with the conversation, did Mr. Stites discuss 
the matter with you freely and voluntarily? 
A He did. 
Q Was there any coercion or intimidation on your 
part? 
A None. 
Q Was anyone in the room armed? 
A Yes. 
Q. Who was armed? 
A Mr. Stites. 
Q Now without-
11 
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MR. FADEL: Now I object, your honor, and 
move that the answer be stricken, and I move at this 
time for a mistrial, and I think that this was com-
pletely planned by the district attorney and this wit-
ness, and I think that there was no foundation or any 
reason why that matter should have been mentioned 
here, and I move at this time for a new trial. 
THE COURT: The answer is stricken and the 
jury is instructed to disregard it. I didn't know we 
were going to get an answer like that. The motion for 
a mistrial is denied and the motion for a new trial is 
denied. The jury will disregard the answer. 
A discussion in chambers followed (R. 125-130), in 
which the court indicated that mere possession of a firearm 
is not proof in connection with misapplication of funds (R. 
127), without a showing that the appellant was summoned 
to a meeting of the board of directors to account for the 
funds (R. 128). When proceedings resumed in open court, 
the respondent endeavored to lay a foundation to show that 
appellant had been summoned before the board to account, 
but no such answers were forthcoming (R. 131) and the 
matter of the gun was dropped. However, over the objection 
of the appellant, Howell was permitted to testify regarding 
purported conversations he had with appellant in which ap-
pellant was supposed to have explained a money shortage 
by saying "We've made some poor deals" and "I've used the 
money'' (R. 132); ''I used it to take and pay people off down 
in California" (R. 133) but no evidence was presented as to 
what people or for what reasons payment was made. 
When the respondent rested the second time, appellant 
renewed his motion to dismiss, which was denied by the 
court. 
12 
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Appellant called only one witness, Attorney George 
Preston who is the attorney for Wayne Craw, the receiver 
appointed for Valley Motor Company (R. 156). Preston test-
ified that he recalled having told appellant's attorney that 
Preston saw a sales slip with a notation on it of the turn-in 
value of the Budge automobile and $2,000.00 cash and the 
notation was believed to be in the handwriting of appel-
lant. However, Preston testified that he must have been mis-
taken when he told appellant's attorney of the notation that 
Stites had made showing that Budge had paid $2,000.00 cash 
(R. 157), but that Preston did tell appellant's attorney that 
he had seen such a notation (R. 158-159). 
The instructions were discussed by counsel and the court 
and exceptions notes. The court instructed the jury with 
written instructions. Arguments were made to jury and a 
verdict of guilty was returned. 
Appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment (R. 15) 
and a motion for a new trial (R. 16) which motions were 
denied by the court. The motion in arrest of judgment was as 
follows: 
"Defendant respectfully moves the court to en-
ter an order in arrest of judgment so that no judg-
ment be rendered upon the verdict of guilty, for the 
reason that the facts proved to not constitute a pub-
lic offense. 
This motion is made pursuant to the provisions 
of Title 77, Chapter 34, Section 1, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
Dated this 23rd day of July, 1955." 
The motion for a new trial was as follows: 
13 
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"Defendant respectfully requests the court for 
an order granting a new trial in this cause for rea-
sons as follows: 
1. The verdict is contrary to the evidence. 
2. The verdict is contrary to the law. 
3. The court erred in admitting the testimony 
of Clair Lundberg, Wayne Craw and Jay Howell 
relative to conversations of each witness with the de-
fendant concerning the $2,000.00 which is the subject 
of the charge. 
4. The court should have declared a mistrial 
and ordered a new trial after Jay Howell testified 
that the Defendant was the only one armed during 
the conversation in the upper room of the Valley 
Motor Co. 
5. The court misdirected the jury in the mat-
ters of law as excepted to by the defendant in noting 
exceptions to instructions. 
This motion is made pursuant to the provisions 
of Title 77, Chapter 38, Section 3, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
Dated this 23 day of July, 1955." 
14 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN MO-
TION TO QUASH INFORMATION. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS 
OF APPELLANT FOR DISMISSAL AND IN ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF APPELLANT TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL AND 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL UPON TESTIMONY THAT AP-
PELLANT WAS ARMED. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CRAW, HOW-
ELL & LUNDBERG TO TESTIFY CONCERNING CON-
VERSATION WITH ACCUSED. 
POINTV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVI-
DENCE PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT ONE, THE MINUTE 
BOOK. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN MO-
TION TO QUASH INFORMATION. 
The appellant moved to quash the information for the 
reason that it did not charge the defendant with the commis-
sion of an offense (R. 2). The information did not specify 
any statue which was the basis of the charge, but merely 
charged the misapplication of money of a corporation as set 
forth in the statement of facts (Supra p. 2). The Utah Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 77-21-8, provides as follows: 
"77-21-8. Charging the offense. - (1) The 
information or indictment may charge, and is valid 
and sufficient if it charges the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted in one or more of the 
following ways: 
(a) By using the name given to the offense by 
the common law or by a statue. 
(b) By stating so much of the definition of the 
offense, either in terms of the common law or of the 
statute defining the offense or in terms of substan-
tially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the 
court and the defendant notice of what offense is in-
tended to be charged. 
(2) The information or indictment may refer 
to a section or subsection of any statute creating the 
offense charged therein, and in determining the 
validity or sufficiency of such information or indict-
ment regard shall be had to such reference." 
The portion of the statute applicable to the instant case 
is subdivision (b). The definition of the offense of misapply-
ing corporate funds is neither defined by statute nor by 
common law. Where the statute creating the offense defines 
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it by use of precise words and designates and specifies parti-
cular acts or means whereby the offense may be committed, 
the language of the statute may be sufficient; but where 
particular acts or facts are not specified by statute and many 
things may be done which constitute the offense, it is neces-
sary in charging the offense to set forth particular things or 
acts charged to have been done with reasonable certainty 
and distinctness so that the defendant can make his defense 
and protect himself after judgment against another prose-
cution for the same offense. 
In the case of State v. Jopham, 41 U 39, 123 Pac. 888, 
Justice Straup, fully discussed this proposition in a lengthy 
opinion. The defendant was convicted of the crime of pander-
ing and sentenced to a term of eighteen years. The informa-
tion charged that the defendant "did then and there wilfully, 
unlawfully and feloniously, by promises and threats, and by 
divers devices and schemes, cause, induce, persuade and en-
courage" a particularly named female, "being then and 
there an inmate of a certain house of prostitution, to remain 
therein as such inmate; such house of prostitution being then 
and there known as No. 140 in what is commonly known as 
the stockade in Salt Lake City." 
A demurrer to the information was denied. This court 
at page 42 stated: 
"The doctrine is fundamental, and, as stated by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Rosen v. 
United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 Sup. Ct. 434, 40 L. Ed. 
606, that "the constitutional right of a defendant to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion against him entitles him to insist, at the outset, 
by demurrer or by motion to quash, and after ver-
dict, by motion in arrest of judgment, that the indict-
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ment shall apprise him of the crime charged with 
such reasonable certainty that he can make his de-
fense and protect himself after judgment against 
another prosecution for the same offense;" and by 
Mr. Justice Sanborn in Floren v. United States, 186 
Fed. 961, 108 C.C.A. 577, that: 
"'On a motion in arrest of judgment, as well 
as on a demurrer, it is essential to the validity of an 
indictment that it contain averments of the facts 
which constitute the offense it charges so certain and 
specific that upon conviction or acquittal thereon it, 
and the judgment upon it, will constitute a complete 
defense to a second prosecution of the defendant for 
the same offense."' 
"It is also elementary and, as stated by the 
Michigan court in People v. Marion, 28 Mich. 257, ap-
proved and quoted by this court in State v. McKenna, 
24, Utah, 317, 67 Pac. 815, that, 'as every man is pre-
sumed innocent until proved to be guilty, he must be 
presumed also to be ignorant of what is intended to 
be proved against him, except as he is informed by 
the indictment or information."' 
At page 44, this court held: 
"The same thought is expressed by Mr. Justice 
Frick in the case of State v. Swan, 31 Utah, 336, 88 
Pac. 12, that, 
"'Where an act denounced by the statute is 
couched in generic terms, the information must go 
further in stating the offense than be merely using 
the language of the statute,' and that an information 
in such language is not sufficient 'in those cases 
where the acts constituting the offense are nearly 
as varied as the number of cases in which the charge 
is made.'" 
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This court goes on to state in its analysis on pages 46, 
47 and 48, that the physical acts claimed to have been done 
by defendant should be alleged; that 
"Should one assert to another that he had a 
'device or scheme' to accomplish a particular result, 
would that 'in ordinary and concise language enable 
a person of ordinary understanding to know what 
was intended' or meant? To enable such a person to 
know what was intended, would not the first ques-
tion necessarily be, 'What is the device or scheme?'; 
that 
"When the defendant was charged that she had 
'by divers devices and schemes' accomplish a parti-
cular result, who but the pleader knew what was in-
tended or expected to be proved against her in such 
respect? Or, if it should be claimed that she by 
'threats' had accomplished such result, again, who 
but the pleader could know with reasonable certainty 
what menacing act or conduct of hurt or fear or 
threatening menace to inflict pain or punishment 
or injury to person, reputation or property, or tore-
strain freedom of action, was intended or expected to 
be proved? Should one complain of another that he 
'threatened' him, would not again the first question 
necessarily be, in order to 'enable a person of com-
mon understanding to know' what was meant or in-
tended, 'What did he say or do?' And, if it should be 
claimed that the defendant by 'promises' had accom-
plished such result, again, could any one but the 
pleader know with reasonable certainty just what 
particular acts or conduct in that regard was in-
tended or expected to be proved?"; that 
"As the accused 'must be presumed ignorant of 
what is intended to be proved against him except as 
he is informed by the information or indictment,' it 
is essential that the information or indictment, not 
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the evidence, apprise him with reasonable certainty 
what is intended or expected to be proved, and what 
he is required to meet and defend. And, as repeatedly 
stated by the courts, the acts constituting the offense, 
and the particular circwnstances of the offense, when 
they are necessary to constitute a complete offense, 
are required to be stated in the information, so that 
the court may determine whether the acts and con-
duct complained of constitute a violation of statute. 
It surely cannot be contended that the determination 
of such a question is alone for the jury, and that it 
is at liberty to regard anything a promise, anything 
a threat, anything a device, anything a scheme. 
Should one either in a civil or criminal pleading 
charge another at a specified time and place 'with 
having cheated and defrauded' him, without alleging 
the acts, the conduct, the facts constituting the cheat 
or fraud, certainly no one would contend that to be a 
sufficient pleading to withstand a demurrer. What 
more has been done here? The pleader has stated his 
conclusion that the defendant has said or done some-
thing, that she has been guilty of some kind of con-
duct, or committed acts of some kind, which in his 
opinion amount to a promise or a threat or a device 
or a scheme, but withheld from the court and the de-
fendant a statement of any acts committed, or things 
said or done, by her, or any facts or circumstances 
from which it may be determined whether in law a 
promise or threat was made, or a device or scheme 
used or employed, by her. The acts and conduct of 
the defendant, and the facts and circumstances con-
stituting the promise, the threat, the device, the 
scheme, were required to be alleged in the informa-
tion, so that the court could judge whether the ac-
cused should have been put upon trial, and that she 
might then know what she was to defend against." 
The court cites the following cases: 
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United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 8 Sup. Ct. 571: 
"In the United States v. Hess, supra, and in the 
federal cases just cited, it was held that an indict-
ment based on and in the language of the statute 
directed against 'devising or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud,' to be affected by com-
munication through the post office, must not only 
allege that the person did devise a scheme or artifice 
to defraud, but it must be set out clearly and dis-
tinctly what that artifice was, wherein the fraud con-
sisted, the facts and circumstances by which it was 
to be accomplished, the facts which constitute the 
specific scheme or artifice so devised by the defend-
ant, and that this must be done, not inferentially, but 
by direct and positive averments." 
People v. Neil, 91 Cal 465, 27 Pac 763: 
"In People v. Neil, supra, it was held that an 
information charging that the defendant 'fraudu-
lently voted at an election when he was not entitled 
to vote,' though in the language of the statute, is not 
sufficient to state an offense, but must set forth the 
facts relied on to show fraudulent voting and the 
particular fact or facts showing that the defendant 
was not entitled to vote." 
State v. Farmer, 104 N.C. 887, 10 SE 563: 
"In State v. Farmer, supra, it was held that an 
indictment against a physician, in the language of 
the statute for giving a false and fraudulent pre-
scription for liquors, must set out not only that the 
prescription was either false or fraudulent, but also 
the facts and particulars constituting the falsity 
or fraud.'' 
The court held further at page 54 that an information 
wanting in any essentials cannot be helped by the evidence 
or verdict. 
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The conclusion arrived at by this court was as follows: 
"The conclusion reached holding the information 
defective in the particulars stated not only works a 
reversal of the judgment but a discharge of the de-
fendant. We have a statute (C.L. 1907, section 4694) 
which provides that 'an information may be amended 
in matter of substance or form at any time before 
the defendant pleads, without leave of court. The 
information may be amended at any time thereafter 
and on the trial as to all matters of form, at the 
discretion of the court, where the same can be done 
without leave of court. The information may be 
amended at any time thereafter and on the trial as 
to all matters of form, at the discretion of the court, 
where the same can be done without prejudice to 
the rights of the defendant.' An amendment sup-
plying proper allegations and curing the defects of 
this information is matter of substance, not form. 
The particular defects were, before plea, specifically 
pointed out by the special demurrer. The undoubted 
right to amend the information in respect to the 
particulars wherein it is defective then existed. In-
stead of amending it, when an amendment was per-
missible, the hazard of a trial and a conviction on 
a bad information was taken. The right to now 
amend is lost. The statute, whether wisely or un-
wisely, forbids it. 
The order therefore is that the judgment of the 
court below be reversed, and the case remanded to 
the district court, with directions to discharge the 
defendant." 
The information in the instant case in no way specified 
the acts by which it was claimed the appellant "wilfully, 
unlawfully and feloniously" misapplied the money of the cor-
poration. There is no allegation as to what, in fact, the ap-
pellant did with the money; what he should have done with 
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· it; what authority or direction required appellant to apply 
money and if so in what way and to what purpose. The ap-
pellant had no way of knowing whether by this information 
he was going to have to prove a complete accounting be-
tween himself and the corporation, creditors of the corpora-
tion and others; whether it was claimed to be improper for 
appellant to have a personal account with the corporation; 
whether it was improper to comingle funds of his own with 
the corporation; whether it was improper to make payments 
and dealings from his own account for corporate purposes; 
whether his acts were fraudulent as to stockholders or cre-
ditors, and if so, what acts were fraudulent and in what 
particulars was anyone defrauded. There is no allegation 
of what section or sections of the statute prohibit any of the 
acts claimed to have been done by appellant. 
In the case of State v. Spencer 101 U 274, 117 P 2d 
455, denying hearing 101 U 287, 121 P 2d 912, the informa-
tion accused the defendant 
"of the crime of Perjury, committed as follows, to 
wit: That the said Sid K. Spencer, on the 31st day of 
May, A.D., 1939, at the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, committed perjury, by testifying as follows: 
"'I have not driven a car at any time since my 
license was revoked for drunken driving' contrary to 
the provisions of the statute. * * *" 
This court held that the information did not charge a 
crime under the requirements of subdivision (b) of 77-21-8, 
and remanded the cause for dismissal, since there had been 
no specification of the degree of perjury nor any particulars 
specifying the degree; nor does a bill of particulars supply 
any defect in an information. 
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The ruling of this court in State v. Jopham (supra) 
was quoted and followed by the Supreme Court of Idaho in 
State v. Groseclose, 171 P2d 863 (1946) wherein they held 
a charge permitting cattle at large in the words of the 
statute, "without proper care and attention" was insufficient 
without additional averments clearly setting forth all of the 
elements and acts which constituted the crime charged 
It would seem that the requirements of alleging fraud 
and misapplication in criminal cases would be even greater 
than that required in civil cases which requires that in all 
averments of fraud the circumstances constituting fraud 
shall be stated with particularity (Rule 9 (b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure) . Especially should this be true since neither 
criminal fraud nor misapplication are defined by statute. 
The United States Supreme Court in the case of United 
States v. James H. Britton, 107 U.S. 655, 27 L. Ed 520, Sup. 
Ct. 512, where a bank president was charged with over 100 
counts in connection with his use of bank funds, the court in 
holding the counts relative to misapplication of corporate 
funds insufficient stated: 
"We think the willful misapplication made an 
offense by this statute means, a misapplication for 
the use, benefit or gain of the party charged, or of 
some company or person other than the association. 
Therefore, to constitute the offense of willful mis-
application, there must be a conversion to his own use 
or the use of some one else, of the moneys and funds 
of the association by the party charged. This es-
sential element of the offense is not averred in the 
counts under consideration, but is negatived by the 
averment that the shares purchased by the defend-
ant were held by him in trust for the use of the 
association, and there is no averment of a conversion 
by the defendant to his own use or the use of any 
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other person, of the funds used in the purchase of 
the shares. The counts, therefore, charge malad-
ministration of the affairs of the bank, rather than 
criminal misapplication of the funds. 
If we hold these counts to be good, then every 
official act of an officer, clerk or agent of a bank 
association, by which its funds are applied in a way 
not authorized by law, would be punishable under 
section 5209." 
"The words 'willfully misapplied' are, so far as 
we know, new in statutes creating offenses, and they 
are not used in describing any offense at common 
law. They have no settled technical meaning like the 
words 'embezzle,' as used in the statutes, or the 
words 'steal, take and carry away,' as used in com-
mon law. They do not, therefore, of themselves fully 
and clearly set forth every element of the offense 
charged. It would not be sufficient simply to aver 
that the defendant 'willfully misapplied' the funds of 
the association. This is well settled by the author-
ities we have already cited. There must be averments 
to show how the application was made, and that it 
was an unlawful one. These everments the pleader 
has in these counts attempted to make by charging 
that the defendant paid out the funds of the associ-
ation in the purchase of its own stock. But this is 
not, necessarily, an unlawful use of the funds of the 
association. It is not every purchase of its own shares 
by an association that is forbidden." 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS 
OF APPELLANT FOR DISMISSAL AND IN ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT. 
The appellant moved for dismissal of the information at 
the close of the respondent's case (R. 121) and again when 
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the respondent rested after being permitted to reopen its 
case. Appellant also moved the court to arrest judgment 
( R. 15) . Since these motions concern the sufficiency of the 
evidence to prove the commission of a public offense, they 
will be considered together at this point. 
To sustain a conviction for misapplication of corporate 
funds requires proof of unauthorized, unlawful acts per-
formed with fraudulent intent to defraud corporate stock-
holders. The case of UNITED STATES v. Matot, 146 F2d 197 
(1944) in construing 12 USCA Section 592 which is similar 
to 76-13-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, held that the words 
"wilfully misapplies" requires a proof of fraudulent intent, 
stating: 
"We read the words 'with intent in any case to 
injure or defraud such Federal Reserve Bank' as 
limiting all of Section 592 that goes before; that is, 
as not confined to making false entries. Perhaps that 
construction is unnecessary, for 'wilful misapplica-
tion' of money presupposes fraudulent intent, as does 
'embezzlement'; and although 'abstraction' standing 
alone might perhaps be read otherwise, the context 
forbids. Indeed, the prosecution itself concedes that 
it was obliged to prove fraudulent intent" 
The only Utah case on corporate frauds found by ap-
pellant is that of State v. Pritchett 87 U 104, 34 P2d 704, 
rehearing 87 U 109, 48 P2d 451, where the office manager 
of Utah Poultry Producers Co-operative Association was 
charged with "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraud-
ulently" misapplying the credit of the corporation, and the 
only question considered was the sufficiency of the charge 
upon demurrer thereto. The merits were not considered. 
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In the instant case the evidence was lacking in many 
particulars. Proof of misapplication would seem to require 
the existence of someone in authority over the appellant 
who could specify the manner of application of the funds and 
to establish a rule of conduct, the violation of which, would 
be a misapplication. However as set forth in the statement of 
facts (Supra 3-4) in considering the background of cor-
porate organization and control, the Valley Motor Company 
was essentially on "one-man" corporation; there were no 
directors meetings after business commenced in January, 
1954, and none of the directors other than appellant purpor-
ted to understand, manage or direct the business. There was 
no proof that Appellant was without authority to establish a 
personal account with the corporation or to handle the busi-
ness and funds as he desired. There were many charges be-
ing made to the account of appellant in connection with side 
obligations of the corporation (R. 81) and the account was 
to be reconciled at the end of the year. There was no attempt 
by appellant to conceal any of the transactions in that these 
transactions were recorded in the books and accounts of the 
corporation. The certified public accountant, John Clay, 
testified (R. 95) that any capable man could examine the 
books of Valley Motor Co. and reconstruct the charges 
against the account of appellant, but in figuring the credits 
due appellant, he, of course, would not be able to establish 
the amount of credit due appellant for side obligations paid 
by appellant (R. 96). 
Throughout the entire trial, witnesses for respondent 
testified that the appellant had never directed that the 
$2,000.00 in question be charged to appellant's account, until 
near the end of the trial (R. 154-155) Britzell, the bookeeper 
reluctantly admitted that Britzell had made a memorandum 
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about January 10, 1955, to charge appellant for this $2000.00, 
although Britzell previously (R. 154, line 4) had denied 
that he ever knew the charge was to be made against appel-
lant's account. 
The $2,000.00 check (Plaintiff's Exh. 4) was made pay-
able to the account of appellant. There was no evidence as to 
why the check was drawn payable to appellant personally, 
although Dr. Budge did testify that he gave the check in 
payment for the balance due on the Buick automobile. The 
check being made payable to appellant, he cannot be said 
to have misapplied the check by depositing it to his own ac-
count. This case resolves itself to a matter of accounting be-
tween appellant and the corporation. There is no evidence 
that an accounting was made nor evidence as to a demand 
for settlement of an account, nor the time within which an 
accounting would be required, and if required, who had the 
authority to require the accounting. 
There was no evidence of any fraudulent intent upon 
the part of appellant in the manner in which he dealt with 
the $2,000.00. The bookkeeper finally admitted that he was 
instructed by the appellant to charge the $2,000.00 against 
account of appellant. Then as to what was done with the 
$2,000.00 the trial court permitted the three persons, Craw, 
Howell and Lundberg who were receiving "side payments" 
from appellant to testify that appellant told these three per-
sons that appellant had used the money to cover another 
"fictitious deal." However no explanation or proof \Yas of-
fered as to what constituted a fictitious deal or whether the 
covering of the fictitious deal was for the benefit of the cor-
poration or other persons (R. 104 and 107). These very per-
sons who testified to the "fictitious deal" conversation were 
receiving corporate money in apparent good conscience 
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through appellant, as side payments in addition to their regu-
lar salary under a gentlemen's agreement (R. 114 and 134) 
although these three were creditors of the corporation in the 
sum of $6,000.00 each for capital loans at the outset of busi-
ness in January, 1954. They all knew that the company was 
underfinanced. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF APPELLANT TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL AND 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL UPON TESTIMONY THAT AP-
PELLANT WAS ARMED. 
In the statement of facts (ante 11-12) the entire in-
cident which is the subject of Point III is set forth. Clair 
Lundberg (R. 99-104) and Wayne Craw (109-111) had al-
ready testified over objection of appellant to the "fictitious 
deal" conversation without any mention of weapons. Then 
the respondent reopened its case and over objection of appel-
lant called Jay, Howell apparently, to further testify con-
cerning this same conversation. The particular questions 
and answers were (R. 124). 
Q Was there any coercion or intimidation on your 
part? 
A None. 
Q Was anyone in the room armed? 
A Yes. 
Q Who was armed? 
A Mr. Stites. 
At this point appellant objected and moved for mis-
trial. The court ordered the answer stricken and instructed 
the jury to disregard it, but denied the motion for mistrial 
and new trial. In chambers district attorney contended that 
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he intended to show by the testimony that the appellant 
couldn't have been intimidated because the appellant was 
armed (R. 123 to 126), but this question about arms was 
wholly uncalled for since the immediately previous question 
and answer were: (R. 123 line 11) 
Q Now in that conversation, did Mr. Stites discuss 
the matter with you freely and voluntarily? 
A He did. 
The very foundation questioning negatived the inclination 
of appellant to use force even if he did have a weapon. The 
only purpose the question and answer could serve would 
be that of misleading the jury into the belief that appellant 
was in possession of the gun with criminal intent. The gun 
had nothing to do with this charge in any way and the dis-
trict attorney was unable to lay any foundation which would 
permit further inquiry into the matter of the possession of 
the weapon (R. 131) and the matter was dropped. Never-
theless, the harm had already been done. 
Nothing further could be done or said about the reason 
for the weapon being in possession of appellant to erase the 
matter from the memory of the jurors without risk of in-
curring even greater prejudice. The court should have or-
dered a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CRAW, HOW-
ELL & LUNDBERG TO TESTIFY CONCERNING CON-
VERSATION WITH ACCUSED. 
Lundberg (R. 99-104) and Craw (R. 109-111) were 
permitted to testify that in conversation with appellant on 
about January 18th or 19th, Lundberg asked "What did you 
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do with the $2,000.00 from Bob Budge" and the witness 
were allowed to testify that appellant answered, "I took 
that to cover another fictitious deal." There was no other 
evidence of the use of the money by the appellant, so that 
if that sj;atement about the fictitious deal amounted to a 
confession, it was not admissible without a foundation being 
laid to show the same was voluntary and that the accused 
was fully apprised of his rights. Furthermore since appellant 
was using money of the corporation through his personal 
account to make payments on obligations of the corporation 
and to Craw, Howell & Lundberg by prearrangement with 
Craw, Howell & Lundberg, then if this use of the money was 
a misapplication of corporate funds, Craw, Howell & Lund-
berg are accomplices whose testimony was not corroborated 
by any other evidence. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT ONE, THE MINUTE BOOK. 
The facts concerning the introduction of the purported 
minutes of meeting of the board of directors are set forth 
in the Statement of Facts, (supra page 4). 
A minute book or other record of a corporation must 
be proved to be authentic or its authenticity conceded before 
it is admissible as evidence, Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corpora-
tions, Vol. 9, Sec. 4622, p. 489). 
The original notes taken at the meeting of the board 
were taken by Attorney Champlin (R. 41) and he subse-
quently retyped the notes but the same were never again 
submitted to the Board for approval (R. 42) and were never 
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signed. Attorney Champlin had prepared the by-laws in ad-
vance and some corrections were made, but he did not know 
where the sheets containing the changes might be, although 
he did have a copy of the first draft without the changes 
(R. 50). 
The trial court admitted in evidence the minute book 
"for what it is worth." The jury may well have considered 
this minute book to be worthy evidence of strict organization 
and direction of the Board of Directors in its control of the 
corporation, whereas in fact no such control or direction 
existed, and the defendant himself was in sole control. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY. 
The appellant's request for instructions No. 3 and 4 
were as follows: 
No. 3. "If you find from the evidence that the 
defendant was not restricted by the directors or 
stockholders of the corporation, in handling the 
funds of the corporation, then the defendant cannot 
be guilty of misapplying the funds of the corporation, 
and your verdict should be Not Guilty." 
No. 4. "You are instructed that the affairs of 
a corporation are managed by its directors and offi-
cers for the benefit of the stockholders of the cor-
poration. The statute of the State of Utah which pro-
hibits the unlawful misapplication of corporation 
funds by any director or officer of the corporation 
was intended to protect the stockholders of the cor-
poration, and if the misapplication of corporate funds 
by such directors or officer does not defraud the 
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stockholders, the misapplication of funds is not un-
lawful.'' 
The court refused to give request No. 3, and modified 
No. 4 by striking "for the benefit of the stockholders of the 
corporation" from the first sentence, and by adding "or the 
creditors, if any," after the word "stockholders" in the last 
sentence. 
There is no statute making misapplication of corporate 
funds a crime which appears to be for the benefit of credit-
ors. 76-13-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
". . . ; and every director . . . who embezzles, ab-
stracts, or wilfully misapplies any of the money, 
funds or credits of the corporation or association; 
... " is guilty of a felony. 
Nothing is stated in the statute which would indicate that 
the statute was for the benefit of stockholders or creditors 
or both. The only criminal cases reported in Utah, State v. 
Pritchett, (Supra 26) did not raise this issue, but that 
case involved the many stockholders in the Utah Poultry 
Association. The cases in other jurisdictions, mainly Fed-
eral, concern misapplication of funds of banking corpora-
tions having many stockholders and depositors. 
· If the statute were intended for the protection of a credi-
tor of a non-banking corporation, a creditor would then 
seem to have control over corporate expenditures even to a 
point of controlling the amounts payable to any other credi-
tor at any stated time. There is no greater need to pro-
tect a creditor of a corporation from dissipation of corporate 
funds than to protect a creditor from dissipation of indi-
vidual funds; in each case the creditor is assuming the risk 
that his debtor may expend business capital without paying 
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the creditor, yet a creditor has no criminal recourse to 
assist him in the event an individual debtor becomes in-
solvent irrespective of the reason for the insolvency. 
In civil cases the general rule is that a creditor of a 
corporation has no right to maintain a personal action 
against directors or officers who by their mismanagement 
or negligence have committed a wrong against the corpora-
tion. The cases annotated in 50 ALR 462 support this pro-
position. The reasons for the rule are simply stated in Clark 
v. Lawrence (1856) Brunner, Col. Cas. 637, Fed. Cas. No. 
2,827, 50 ALR 463-4, holding the considerations preventing 
suits by creditors against directors to be as follows: 
''They are: (1) That the directors are the agents 
of the corporation, and not of the creditors, and there 
is no legal privity between them. That for misfeas-
ances and nonfeasances in the execution of their 
agency whereby their principals are injured, agents 
are responsible only to their principals; and that this 
rule is as applicable to corporate agents as to agents 
of natural persons. (2) An injury done to the capital 
of a corporation is not, in contemplation of law, an 
injury to each of its creditors. It is true, such injury 
may prevent the corporation from paying its debts, 
in whole or in part; and a similar injury to an indi-
vidual may be followed by the same consequence to 
his creditors ... " 
No where in the penal statutes of Utah does it specifi-
cally appear that misapplication of corporate funds which 
prevents the corporation from meeting its obligations to 
creditors is a crime, and a matter so serious as to constitute 
a felony should not be implied from such an indefinite and 
uncertain statute especially where such implication extends 
the criminal responsibility beyond the scope of civil liability. 
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THE APPELLANT DULY EXCEPTED TO THE FOL-
LOWING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1. The court had originally drafted 
No. 1 (R. 9) to read that to find the defendant guilty, it 
would require proof that defendant did ". . . wilfully, un-
lawfully, and feloniously misapply money of said corporation 
in the sum of $2,000.00 .... "However, during the course of 
instructing the jury, the court deleted the words unlawfully 
and feloniously." The information itself charged that the 
act was done "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniuosly." United 
States v. Matot, supra 26, holds that the charge of "wil-
ful misapplication" requires proof of fraudulent intent as 
does embezzlement. United States v. Britton, supra 24, 
indicates that there must be proof of unlawful application 
of funds in order to prove "wilfull misapplication." 
The trial court merely made an inked line through the 
words "unlawfully and feloniously" (R. 9) without oblit-
erating these words, thus the jurors in seeing these words 
could reasonably conclude that there was no necessity of 
finding an unlawful or felonious act. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5. (R. 10) reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that a corporation is an 
artificial person created by law, a separate and dis-
tinct entity from its individual members or stock-
holders, and this is true even though all its stock is 
owned by a single individual." 
This may well be a correct statement of law, but its 
only application to this case is that of convincing the jury 
that even though appellant owned all of the stock he owed 
a special duty of faith and protection to a separate entity, 
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the corporation, and that his responsibility would be the 
same whether there were one or one hundred stockholders. 
INSTRUCTION No. 6. (R. 11) is objectionable for similar 
reasons advance in connection with the refusal of the court 
to instruct the jury upon appellants request for instructions 
No.3 and 4, in that the court instructed the jury that if the 
act of the appellant was a fraud upon creditors or stock-
holders it was an unlawful misapplication of funds. 
INSTRUCTION No. 7. (R. 11) was as follows: 
"The word 'misapply' means to use the Valley 
Motor Company funds in a manner and for a purpose 
not authorized, to divert funds from rightful purpose 
to wrongful purpose, and to use them improperly." 
" 'Wilful' means to do the act by design and evil 
intent.'' 
Appellant excepted to this instruction (R. 161) for the 
reason that the instruction failed to show by whom auth-
orization should be given. The trial court later interlineated 
after the word "authorized," the words "by law" (R. 162). 
This instruction was still faulty in that no where were the 
jurors informed as to what use of corporate funds was auth-
orized by law. Instruction No. 7 is further faulty in that 
either the word "misapply" or the word "wilful" should have 
been defined to include "unlawful and felonious" action. 
NOTATIONS ON MARGIN OF INSTRUCTIONS. 
There are some unusual penciled notations on the mar-
gin of the instructions (R. 9, 10, and 11). These may have 
been made by one of the jurors, since I trust they were not 
made before being presented to the jury, which show the 
emphasis placed by the jurors upon certain instructions. 
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Most unusual, however, is the penciled comment (R. 10) 
with an arrow pointing to instruction No. 4, as follows: 
"No evidence of Vally Motor Corp. being credit-
ed for $2,000.00 of Robert Budge Check." 
This clearly shows that the jury completely ignored 
the terstimony of Don Britzell under cross examination 
(supra 9) (R. 154) wherein Britzell finally admitted that 
he was told by appellant to charge the appellant for the 
Robert Budge account. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged that: 
The information should have been quashed upon motion 
of the appellant, and that appellant is entitled to a reversal 
of the judgment and discharge. 
The motions of the appellant to dismiss and in arrest 
of judgment should have been granted, and that the appel-
lant is entitled to a reversal of judgment and discharge. 
The trial court erred in its admission of testimony at 
trial and in its instructions to the jury for which, if the 
judgment is not reversed as above requested, the appellant 
is entitled to a new trial. 
The jury misconceived and ignored the evidence as is 
particularly shown by its penciled notations on the instruc-
tions, for which appellant is entitled to a new trial if not re-
leased as above requested. 
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